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1. Introduction 
Recent decades have witnessed a trend of privatization, deregulation and 
liberalization – and not only in industrialized countries but also in many countries 
that used to be called developing and that have more actively pursued the path of 
a market-economy-based industrialization. There is a dominant consensus among 
economists that market economies require an effective competition policy regime 
in order to protect competition against its self-eroding tendencies: next to being 
successful by a welfare-increasing competition on the merits, companies may expe-
rience incentives to secure rents by engaging in anticompetitive strategies and ar-
rangements. Consequently, the number of (more or less) active competition policy 
regimes has significantly increased, in particular throughout the 2000s (Budzinski 
2013a).  
While the predominantly beneficial character of this development is hardly in 
doubt, the question what kind of competition policy is adequate for industrializing 
countries is much more controversial. On the one hand, transplanting institutions 
and agendas from successful competition policy regimes like the US or the EU 
represents a strategy that is both advocated and also what many industrializing 
countries have actually attempted to do. However, it implicitly assumes that there 
is a ‘one-size-fits-all’ competition policy, i.e. one ‘right’ competition policy that is 
optimal irrespective of a countries’ economic and social characteristics. In this 
chapter, we argue from an economics perspective that this is not the case. Instead, 
the relevant economic problems of industrializing countries – being in the process 
of establishing a competitive market economy – and industrialized countries – 
having a long tradition of a workable competitive market economy – differ to a 
significant extent. While the competition policy agenda of a long-established mar-
ket economy is characterized by the target to protect the existing and well-
functioning competition as well as to reap marginal efficiencies that are still 
available in an otherwise comparatively efficient economy, the urgent problem of 
many industrializing countries is to generate effective competition in the first place. 
‘Protecting what we have’ will often imply to prolong and conserve anticompetitive 
structures. When combined with privatization and liberalization, this may abet a 
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pure transfer of public economic power into private economic power – without ge-
nerating competition. Therefore, many industrializing countries need a competition 
policy agenda that differs from those of industrialized countries in the sense that it 
focuses more on the active generation of competition and so much constrain itself 
to the protection of a well-working system. In a way, an appropriate competition 
policy may resemble more the ones that the now industrialized countries employed 
when they started to seriously care about competition. 
In this chapter, we attempt to sketch a competition policy agenda for 
industrializing countries that meet or come close to meeting several typical 
characteristics. Section 2 outlines these characteristics and thus specifies the 
addressees of our paper. Thereafter, section 3 discusses fundamental principles of a 
competition policy agenda for industrializing countries, in particular a focus on a 
rule-based approach, the special role of guidance, fairness considerations and the 
spirit of competition as well as the need for setting priorities. Section 4 exemplifies 
more specifically what these principles imply for the actual competition policy 
agenda. 
 
2. Competition and Competition Policy in Industrialized and in Industrializing 
Countries: Exploring the Difference 
It is impossible to characterize the economies of ‘the’ developing countries by a 
precise set of stylized facts. The economic systems and structures of countries on 
the brink of industrialization and in different stages of development are 
considerably heterogeneous and what is true for one country can be completely 
wrong for another one. Still, this fact should not lead economic analysis to limit 
itself to country studies and relinquish any more general considerations. Although 
country studies are highly valuable (because it is the only way to consider the 
important country-specific features and circumstances), it is also valuable to discuss 
some more general economic aspects that are relevant for many (even though 
certainly not all) countries. In this spirit we highlight some rather general economic 
features and characteristics in this section that are quite typical for industrializing 
countries (without claiming that they are relevant for each and every country). The-


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se economic features and characteristics are related to discussion in the following 
sections in the way that the more a country meets the described characteristics, the 
better suited is our reasoning. If a country does not meet the general characteristics 
outlined in this section, then our competition policy recommendations should be 
viewed with caution for this case. 
Many industrializing countries have undergone reforms that contributed to the 
liberalization of the economy in recent decades, albeit often from the starting point 
of a predominantly state-organized and centrally-planned economy and with 
varying degrees of intensity. Still, liberalization often entailed technological, 
ideological, social and economic changes (Singh 2006). Liberalization embraces free 
trade and free markets on local, national, regional and international levels. Free 
markets with free trade, in turn, lead to the existence of certain characteristics of 
economic interactions, one of the more important ones being competition. 
However, in particular in societies where competition has no tradition of 
representing the dominant economic coordination mechanism, there are different 
points of views and understandings about the nature of competitive markets 
(Singh 2006). Liberalizing economic and social reforms do not automatically 
establish an understanding of the nature of competition and the acceptance of 
competitive markets and their outcomes as a superior way of organizing the eco-
nomy. It is somewhat puzzling that even economists often tend to overlook this 
fact since the way towards established and accepted market economy structures 
has been long and painful in so-called “Western” countries (in Europe and North-
America) as well. The path from Adam Smith’s (1776) landmark conceptual 
contribution – highlighting the welfare effects of individualistic economies based 
upon institutionally-safeguarded competitive markets – to the emergence of 
sustainable competitive market as the dominant coordination mechanism in the 
late 19th and mid-20th century was a long and stony road with many obstacles 
(Gerber 1998). At the end of the day, liberalizing reforms succeeded in establishing 
sustainable competitive markets when they were accompanied by the acceptance 
and internalization of a “spirit of competition” (Hoppmann 1967, 1968) by the 
market participants (companies as well as consumers and public authorities).  
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Furthermore, one must be careful not to forget that economics is a social science 
that consists of differing concepts and paradigms as well. The term competition 
has evolved through different understandings in economic thinking as well and 
some previously popular concepts like the (misleadingly) ‘perfect competition’ 
labeled homogeneous polypoly paragon are widely believed to be outdated today. 
Even today there is not one single ‘true’ theory of competition (Budzinski 2008). 
Instead, modern oligopoly theory, modern institutional economics as well as dyna-
mic innovation economics tackle different aspects of competition as a decentralized 
coordination mechanism with different models and concepts (Budzinski 2008, 
2011).  
However, back to the industrializing countries introducing competition into their 
economies (or increasing the role of it): the meaning of free markets with free trade 
is not given. Instead, it is shaped by a combination of external explanation (the im-
port of the institution competition) and internal prejudice (which is shaped by the 
local and regional context). For a long time, the external explanation has been 
dominated by the so-called “Washington Consensus” and liberalization policy often 
followed an extreme interpretation of it (Fox 2012: 276-277). In terms of antitrust 
this extreme interpretation implies a focus on avoiding and deterring government 
interventions and putting (short-term) efficiency on top of everything: more 
competition equals more welfare and more competition automatically follows free 
markets. However, the empirical record of the Washington consensus is assessed to 
be not convincing by prominent economists (inter alia, Rodrik 2006). Probably one 
of the more important reasons is that it neglected the anticompetitive effects of 
private (business) market power that not seldom merely replaced the previous ad-
ministrative stranglehold on the economy (Fox 2012: 276).1 This is actually a pat-
tern that resembles some of the stones in the pathway of developing market 
economies in Western Europe in the 20th century. And it motivated the emergence 
of so-called ordoliberal thinking in Germany focusing on how to establish working, 
sustainable and accepted competitive markets instead of focusing on reaping mar-
ginal efficiencies (Eucken 1952, 2006; Budzinski 2008: 305-308). While this kind of 

1 This is supported by economic evidence that a workable competition policy regime promotes 
welfare and development (Aghion & Shankerman 2004; Voigt 2009). 


5 

thinking has been widely criticized recently regarding its role in ongoing today’s 
well-established market economies like in the European Union, it may very well 
have a point when it comes to creating a market economy (instead of ‘just’ 
preserving or optimizing it).  
Competitive markets require a competition regime which consists of policies and 
laws, defining and enforcing the rules of the game. This includes rules against 
anticompetitive actions and arrangements, i.e. against actions and arrangements 
which impede (or even destroy) existing competition in markets. In industrialized 
countries all these considerations stand in line with political and cultural facts. 
Having democratic political systems under the ‘rule of law’ and having the social 
acceptance of ‘private property’ may be sufficient to lead to acceptance of having 
competition as the dominant (economic) coordination mechanism in such 
jurisdictions. This acceptance in turn has been the fundament for having relaxed 
rules to start new businesses (fewer barriers to entry and lower ratios of 
concentration). In summary: sustainable competitive markets exist and ‘just’ need 
to be preserved or optimized. However, this is the focal point of difference 
between industrialized and industrializing countries: while the former target an 
optimization of a working and accepted market economy (protecting competition), 
the latter aim to establish working and accepted competitive markets (generating 
competition). 2  From an economic perspective, this important difference in 
phenomenon requires different recipes in policy. 
Many industrializing countries, in particular those who used to (or are still having) 
have political systems like the ones in communist countries, do not have a tradition 
of accepting “private property” as a general rule. So there may be persistent 
skepticism towards the idea that competition and individualistic trade will lead to 
more social welfare. In particular, as soon as some sort of crisis surfaces (which hits 
any type of economic systems from time to time), this skepticism may quickly gain 
decisive momentum. Also, in many industrializing countries the main players in the 

2  Note that distinguishing generating competition from protecting competition follows a 
didactical purpose. Of course, generating competition will always include the immediate protec-
tion of the generated competition – however, by other means as if protection of existing 
competition is the main task. 
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economy are the ones with political power. Therefore and despite some limited 
liberalization progress, there is no belief in “privatization”, or more specifically in 
decentralizing economic power. As a consequence, in many countries centralized 
economic power is maintained through the liberalization process by transferring 
public authority power into private hands but without de-concentrating markets.3 
Additionally, strict regulations for starting a business as well as serious barriers to 
entry and to expansion frustrate effective competition and protect noncompetitive 
structures. Many developing countries suffer from having a dual characteristic eco-
nomy (Singh 2006). One major traditional part which has arisen based on roots like 
religion, culture, political regimes and so on as well as one minor or middle modern 
part which has been created in response to globalization and trade. In many 
developing countries these two parts are not performing in coordination which 
makes setting a comprehensive competition policy rather more difficult since they 
may display very different levels and characteristics of concentration, competition 
and cooperation. Quite in contrast, aggressive “competition” strategies by power-
ful incumbent companies (the not de-concentrated successors of former public 
monopolies), like predatory pricing, deterrence, foreclosure and raising rivals’ costs 
strategies, may erode any profit opportunities for upcoming businesses and such 
from the more traditional sector and, as such, diminish incentives for further in-
vestment from both sides (Singh 2006). In the face of imperfect and deficient capi-
tal markets and without an existing reservoir of potential competitors, (in 
particular!) including entrepreneurial competences and experience, competition 
may quickly be perceived as an instrument to protect existing privileges rather than 
creating efficiency and welfare. While in a long-established, comprehensive market 
economy the emergence of private market power through competition may be 
viewed as ambivalent (reaping efficiencies versus being abused for 
monopolization), in economies where competition is not well-established and 
represents the exception rather than the rule, prevalent private market power posi-
tions are means of income distribution – towards the privileged and away from the 
others. Not accidentally, the German ordoliberal economists viewed the power-

3 The private hands may be those of former or current government officials or such of influential 
families or leading societal groups close to the government. 


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eroding force of competition to be an important element of generating (more) 
competition in a hybrid economy.4 However, this requires a strict policy against any 
private attempts to undermine this power-eroding effect, for instance also by 
empowering emerging competitors. Again, different economic structures require 
different rules of the game. 
In summary, there are fundamental differences between industrialized and 
industrializing countries in regard of the organization of the economy. Thus, there 
is no ‘one size fits all’ in regard to competition rules and policy. Different economic 
situations require different economic policy answers. Competition policy is not an 
isolated concept; it needs to be effective in respect to the context of the society 
where it is implemented. To be able to achieve such effectiveness, a common noti-
on of “competition” and its role for the society is required. The insight that 
competition is the best available coordination mechanism for organizing the eco-
nomy because it tends towards (i) an efficient allocation of production factors (la-
bor, capital and resources), (ii) provides incentives for business performance, effi-
ciency and customer focus, (iii) creates incentives for innovation and technological 
as well as organizational progress, and (iv) improves the adaptive efficiency and 
robustness of an economy by keeping business in the practice of acting and 
reacting to competitive forces (instead of relying on privileged positions or 
remaining in agony about powerless positions) is not a necessarily a fast-selling 
item.5 Next to these purely economic effects, maximizing in tendency the material 
welfare of a society, competition provides a liberty and a participation effect. Free-
dom of choice on the consumers’ side combined with freedom of production on 
the sellers’ side of a market create competition and competition is an expression of 
this economic liberty. Moreover, competitive markets provide participatory liberty 
since they are open and everyone can inject her creativity and be successful. Thus, 

4 Fox (2012: 277-278) interprets the so-called Spence report (2008; chaired by economics Nobel 
 prize laureate Mike Spence), calling for inclusive growth matters (i.e. distribution counts, 
 especially an equal distribution of opportunity), in a way that would make it compatible with this 
 kind of thinking. 
5  These effects are well-known and uncontroversial among economists. However, they are not 
necessarily that well known outside the economist’s world. Unfortunately, economists tend to 
forget that and often neglect to emphasize the importance of these well-known effects of 
competition again and again instead of immediately entering into more technical debates.  
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competition offers opportunities.6 However, competition requires that the market 
participants share a certain spirit of competition which may be viewed in analogy 
to sportsmanship7: it is a common mentality to inject skills, competences, will and 
creativity into a contest for the best – but only ‘winning’ on the merits counts; it is 
frowned upon and not acceptable to ‘win’ by handicapping others. Just like in 
sports, rules are required to frustrate the odd ‘cheating’ attempt. However, just like 
in sports, rules cannot work if the mindset of a majority does not value the rules 
and its underlying mentality: if nobody follows the rules, rule-enforcement 
becomes impossible.8 In brief, a certain spirit of competition is a precondition for a 
working, sustainable and accepted competitive market economy. It is an important 
point that we want to make that generating competition requires an active promo-
tion of such a spirit of competition. Consequently, competition policies in societies 
without a distinct spirit of competition require different competition rules and 
policies than societies which enjoy this spirit of competition. 
In the following sections we sketch such a competition policy focusing on genera-
ting competition. Its fit to any given society depends on the features and 
characteristics of this society. The better the following stylized facts describe an 
economy, the higher is the fit of our competition policy concept:9 
- dominance of state-owned firms and their privileged successors; dominating 
state-owned or formerly state-owned incumbents including parastatal ow-
nership, leading families ownership (oligarchic structures) and privileged 
privatized business, 
- highly concentrated markets and/or sclerotic markets, 
- poorly working or deficient capital markets, 
- scarce human and financial capital, 

6 As Fox (2012: 275) puts it, competition empowers people to do what they can do for themselves. 
7 To some degree, Adam Smith (1776) originally ‘borrowed’ the concept of competition from 
sports. 
8 The need for respective values in order to make competition work was already present in the 
work of Adam Smith (1759). 
9 According to our preceding paragraphs as well as according to, inter alia, Khemani (2007) and 
Fox (2012: 280-281) these stylized facts fit well to numerous industrializing and developing 
countries. 


9 

- high barriers to business creation and expansion as well as market entry (and 
exit), 
- significant amount of (regulatory) capture and corruption, 
- extensive informal economy 
- social ties favoring collusion and discouraging its detection, 
- barriers to mobility due to sclerotic society structures (like rigid caste sys-
tems); marginalized groups (or even marginalized majority) deterred from 
participation in the economic life of the community, 
- lack of (local) competition culture; lack of a spirit of competition. 
From these stylized factors it should be clear that countries, who do not have 
established market economy institutions at all (or even represent so-called failing 
states), do not represent the addressees of our paper. Instead, we address countries 
that are already progressing on their way to becoming an industrialized market 
economy but are still suffer from transformation issues and problems tracing back 
to pre-market economy structures. 
 
3.  A Policy for Generating Competition: Fundamentals and Principles 
3.1 Institutional Framework Conditions 
Implementing a workable and effective competition policy regime is a multidimen-
sional task. While we focus in this contribution on the competition policy strategy, 
another important area is the fundamental set-up of the competition policy: the 
institutional framework conditions. Important ingredients include an independent 
competition authority, trustworthy institutions, judicial review and an advocacy 
role for the authority (inter alia, Kovacic 2001; World Bank Report 2002; Fox 2007, 
2012; UNCTAD 2010; Kovacic & Hyman 2012). Independence of the competition 
authority refers to being independent from non-competition influences by the 
government or lobby groups (Vickers 2010; Jenny 2012; Budzinski 2013b). In order 
to establish an effective competition regime, the authority must be able to focus on 
competition matters only and with the same stance towards all participants of the 
economy. This requires a certain protection of the competition authority against 
deviating (vested) interests by powerful and privileged groups and (their influences 
10 
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on) the government. Only if the competition authority can act independently, the 
competition institutions can become trustworthy in the sense that they follow the 
rule of law. The possibility of the norm addressees to go for a judicial review of the 
competition authority procedures and decisions (requiring independent and 
trustworthy courts) further improves the rule of law. Altogether, these institutional 
framework conditions must serve to create a reputation of the competition regime 
and its authorities to act as an impartial referee on market competition. If this re-
putation is established, an advocacy role of the competition authority in the sense 
of advocating competition-friendly laws and regulations in all areas of the economy 
may prove to be valuable to fuel the processes of privatization, deregulation as well 
as the elimination of other restrictions to competition in the course of time.  
Even though the importance of these institutional framework conditions cannot be 
emphasized enough, our chapter turns the focus to a perspective that has been 
somewhat neglected in the literature so far: the competition policy strategy, i.e. we 
focus more on the agenda instead of the framework. Obviously, there are certain 
overlaps and interfaces between framework and agenda and the next section 
addresses the – for our purposes – most important of these interfaces. 
 
3.2 Rule-Based instead of Case-by-Case Approach 
A fundamental decision about the agenda of competition policy that interfaces 
with the institutional framework is whether competition policy should be rule-
based or follow a case-by-case approach. A rule-based competition policy implies 
that if any specific business strategy typically (i.e. more often than not) violates 
competition, then it is always prohibited. In contrast, a case-by-case approach 
implies to analyze each single case on its own merits without prejudice about its 
pro- or anticompetitive effects. Thus, the main difference is whether a given case is 
decided upon typical effects of that type of strategy or arrangement or solely upon 
the effects of the case-specific shape of the strategy or arrangement in question.10 

10 This discussion somewhat resembles the controversy about per se-rules vs. rule of reason, 
however, in a more differentiated way, paying respect to the fact that the extreme points of this 
discussion (like a strict per se-rule) are not the typical phenomenon in competition policy 
anyway. See Christiansen & Kerber (2006). 

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The competition policies of many industrialized countries used to be predominantly 
rule-based. However, recent trends have moved them considerably more towards a 
case-by-case approach (labeled, for instance, as an effects-based approach).11  
The focus on rule-based or case-by-case competition policy may reflect in the 
codified competition rules, i.e. the law or the institutions. However, more often 
than not, the written rules allow for some scope for interpretation, so that the lo-
cation of a specific competition policy on the continuum rule-based ļ case-by-case 
is also a matter of agenda (for instance, expressed in guidelines) and not only of 
the institutional framework.  
The reason for the European and North-American shift towards a case-by-case app-
roach is the error cost that comes along with a rule-based policy. If, for example, 
typically 80 per cent of a certain type of strategy or arrangement harm 
competition, then a rule-based competition policy gets 80 per cent of those cases 
right - but at the same time it gets the 20 per cent that display untypical 
characteristics wrong. On the other hand, a case-by-case approach individually 
analyzes each case without prejudice, heralding that many business strategies can 
display positive and negative effects of their own on competition (e.g. R&D 
cooperation, vertical agreements, mergers, etc.). In a case-by-case analysis, the aim 
is to balance pro- and anticompetitive effects of the specific case in question and, 
thus, to decide every case on its own merit. Consequently, in a perfect world, a ca-
se-by-case approach would minimize the number of erroneous decisions towards 
zero whereas a rule-based approach always includes a certain rate of errors. Thus, 
the recent trends in North-American and European competition policy towards 
embracing case-by-case approaches can be viewed as an attempt to fine-tune these 
far developed and experienced competition policy regimes. 
Again, in a perfect world with perfect knowledge, the case-by-case approach will 
be superior to the rule-based approach because the perfect knowledge will lead the 
single-case analysis to a clear and correct conclusion without ambiguity. However, 
in an imperfect world with imperfect knowledge, a case-by-case approach also 
involves decision errors because the facts and effects of a given case cannot be 

11  See, inter alia, Baker (1999), Neven (2006), Röller & Stehmann (2006) and the literature quoted 
therein. 
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perfectly investigated. In this case, there is – a priori – no clear superiority of either 
concept. It depends on what kind of knowledge is better available (and less 
distorted): single-case knowledge or knowledge about typical effects. For instance, 
if reality is well described by the availability of satisfying knowledge about 
average/typical effects of a type of strategy or arrangement but there is insufficient 
knowledge about single-case effects, then the rule-based approach is superior. This 
is so because the rule-based approach gets the majority of cases right – at least. 
Regarding the question what kind of strategy is best for industrializing countries, it 
becomes important what kind of knowledge is available at what costs.  
- Knowledge about typical effects is an output of science (theory-driven 
assessment of types of strategies and arrangements) as well as of past expe-
rience. The first is generally well available although there might be barriers to 
accessibility (i.e. some expertise is required). The second is obviously not 
directly available for comparatively new and inexperienced regimes. 
However, academic empirical studies summarize past experience and are 
similarly available like the theory output. 
- Single-case knowledge is not available. It must be generated case by case. 
This requires comprehensive and sophisticated case analyses including ex-
pensive instruments like tailor-made models and advanced econometrics and 
simulations. Furthermore, it also requires staff-intensive investigation at a 
high frequency of comprehensive analyses and advanced economic expert 
competences.  
In summary, the agency costs of the case-by-case approach by far exceed the ones 
of a rule-based approach. The same is true for sophisticated and advanced experts’ 
competencies. If it shall be successful in terms of minimizing decision errors, then 
the case-by-case approach requires a well-developed, well-financed and 
experienced competition regime. This may be appropriate if a long-run, well-
equipped and well-established regime in a fully industrialized market economy with 
a developed competition culture shall be fine-tuned in order to reap remaining 
marginal benefits and efficiencies from improving an already high level of 


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competition policy enforcement.12 However, it is highly doubtful if the resources on 
a case-by-case agenda are well-spent for a regime in an industrializing economy 
where competition must be rather generated than protected and a spirit of 
competition has yet to be established.13  
Moreover, there is some likelihood that a case-by-case approach is more prone to 
non-competition influences from governments or lobby groups as well as more 
prone to corruption. Applying a rule offers less scope for injecting all sorts of non-
competition arguments than an open balancing of case-specific and singular ef-
fects. “Special circumstances” exempting the privileged economic agents from 
competition rule enforcement can be easier argued and is more difficult to be 
detected if each case gets assessed on its own without attaching the enforcement 
to a rule. In that sense, accountability and liability of manipulated decisions is lower 
in a case-by-case approach compared to a rule-based approach. A rule-based app-
roach does not exclude corruption but it limits the scope for it since competition 
policy decisions violating the announced rules will cause considerable costs for the 
decision-makers in terms of reputation losses. 
 
3.3 Guidance, the Spirit of Competition and the Role of Fairness 
 Considerations 
As it has been argued in section 2, one of the major differences between the needs 
for competition policy regimes in industrializing countries in contrast to such in 
fully industrialized countries refers to a lack of a spirit of competition or a 
comprehensive competition culture. Consequently, competition policy in 
industrializing countries needs to work on generating and promoting competition 
(whereas competition policy in industrialized countries may focus more on 
protecting the comprehensively existing and predominantly well-working 

12 And even for the European Union and the U.S., the empirical record of moving away from a rule-
based and towards a case-by-case approach is not necessarily convincing (Budzinski 2010; Bud-
zinski & Kuchinke 2012). As far as it can be said today, the number of decision errors has not 
been decreased at all. 
13 “[P]er se rules may be easier and less costly to enforce than ‘rule of reason’ judgments, which 
require careful balancing of costs and benefits of certain potentially anti-competitive practices” 
(Stiglitz & Charlton 2005: 272). 
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competition). Next to intensively discussed issues like privatization and 
liberalization, the development of a competition culture and a spirit of competition 
belong to the important ingredients of comprehensive market competition. 
However, its role and importance is often neglected in the literature. Thus, the 
question what kind of competition policy fuels the emergence of a spirit of 
competition and a competition culture is rarely addressed. 
We argue that guidance and fairness represent two important pillars of a spirit-of-
competition-promoting competition policy agenda. Business companies need 
guidance by the competition policy. Lacking a spirit of competition implies that a 
considerable part of the competitors in the markets are insecure or ignorant about 
how to behave in competition and compete on the merits. This implies, for instan-
ce, that companies may find it more natural to go for anticompetitive cooperation 
arrangements than to compete on innovation and performance. Or incumbents 
may find it absolutely justified to preserve their privileged position (formerly 
guaranteed by public authorities) in the course of liberalization by anticompetitive 
deterring and foreclosure strategies instead of adjusting their products and services 
according to the preferences of the consumers. In other words, business companies 
need guidance as to what is procompetitive behavior and what represents 
unacceptable anticompetitive behavior.  
Whether guidance is provided by competition policy also depends on the approach 
of the competition authority. A case-by-case approach, for instance, expects the 
norm addressees to have considerable expertise and experience on competition ru-
les at their command. It requires comprehensive self-assessment of strategy options 
by business companies in order to anticipate whether a specific strategy or arran-
gement is in line with the competition rules. Since the effects-based outcome of 
the case-individualistic analysis is open, companies are expected to self-assess all 
relevant pro- and anticompetitive effects and balance them. And only if the 
majority of market participants choose procompetitive strategies, any competition 
authority will stand a chance to effectively govern competitive markets. In a world 
consisting predominantly of anticompetitively behaving companies, any authority 
will be overburdened with competition policy enforcement and fail. Thus, 
considerable compliance is a precondition for successful competition policy. Now, if 

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business companies lack experience with competition policy and also lack a spirit of 
competition, then a case-by-case approach is likely to fail to provide the necessary 
guidance to build-up and develop a workable competition culture. In contrast, a 
rule-based approach provides significantly more guidance for business regarding 
what is within the competition and what is outside. It also includes better 
anticipation of competition authority decisions. Clear and unambiguous rules offer 
better learning opportunities for business companies. They learn how to comply 
with competition rules and so they are increasingly deterred from anticompetitive 
behavior which in turns leads to promotion of a competition culture. In other 
words, this approach displays a considerably stronger guidance effect. 
Another issue stressed in section 2 was that competition as the major coordination 
device needs to receive acceptance by the market participants (and by society in 
general), which represents another dimension of developing a spirit of competition. 
If acceptance of competition is not so deeply anchored in the society (in 
industrializing countries), it becomes important that people perceive competition as 
something positive that is improving their life and welfare. If competition and 
outcomes of competitive markets are perceived to be unfair by a large number of 
market participants and people, then the acceptance of competition as the primary 
economic coordination mechanism will not grow and/or be eroded. Even though 
this is basically true also for industrialized countries with an established 
competition culture, it is considerably more important in economies without a well-
established and robust competition culture.14 
The acceptance issue represents an important issue for the competition policy 
agenda because fairness and efficiency may be at crossroads at times. For instance, 
if a dominating incumbent deters or squeezes fringe competitors, this might 
actually be efficient under some circumstances (in the short run) even if it uses 
methods that violate the fairness standards of the people. The latter means that 
instead of directly outperforming the fringe competitor, the dominant incumbent 
speeds up that process by, for instance, raising-rivals’-cost or foreclosure strategies 
(i.e. preventing the fringe from performing). While in former times, fairness 

14 However, the chapters in Theurl (2013) as well as Budzinski (2013c) emphasize that acceptance 
levels and competition culture may not be that robust in industrialized economies as well. 
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considerations played a role in European and North-American competition policy, 
the modern interpretation is that efficiency considerations should trump fairness 
considerations whenever they stand in conflict with each other (Kaplan & Shavell 
2006; Ahlborn & Padilla 2008). However, if acceptance levels of competition are 
low and competition culture is underdeveloped, then a different assessment is 
necessary from an economic perspective: fairness considerations should outplay 
efficiency considerations if 
- the fairness considerations have the potential to influence the development 
and robustness of the competition culture (for instance, have the potential 
to significantly influence acceptance levels), and 
- the efficiencies in question are marginal (either per se or because 
comparable efficiency levels can be reaped by alternative strategies involving 
fair behavior). 
Notwithstanding the importance of fairness considerations for competition policy 
in industrializing countries, a note of caution must be issued: fairness is a concept 
that may be difficult to exactly delineate. Thus, there is a permanent danger that 
vested interests (for instance, by privileged groups) try to sail under the label ‘fair-
ness’ even though they actually attempt to update unfair advantages. Therefore, 
the concept of fairness is not very well suited to be embraced as part of a case-
specific analysis of pros and cons. It rather be employed in the codification of clear 
rules generally outlawing modes of behavior that are perceived to be unfair in the 
sense of contrasting moral norms and values of a large part of society. Section 4.4 
will explain a bit closer how this may work. 
 
3.4 Setting Priorities 
Another common feature of competition policy regimes in industrializing countries 
is the necessity to deal with limited capacities, experiences and budgets. If the 
budget is considerably limited, industrializing jurisdictions should start creating the 
competition regime by setting rules against the most destructive actions which 
have been integrated into the structure of the markets during years. The authorities 

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should find out what anticompetitive actions they need to fight first, because they 
cause exceptional damage or represent the main hurdles against the emergence of 
sustainable competition. This consideration should definitely be taken based on the 
trade-off between the proportion of the budget which is needed to conduct this 
agenda and the percentage of the destructive anticompetitive actions which can be 
diminished. In general, cases with (i) a high damage potential, (ii) a comparably 
clear-cut and unambiguous anticompetitive character, and (iii) a high probability of 
enforcement success should be treated with priority. Second and third priorities 
belong to cases which satisfy either of the criteria above. It seems sensible to give 
no priority to cases which are complex, require lots of resources but promise only 
little gain in terms of generating competition (“marginal cases”). Without 
prioritization, competition policies in developing countries will simply lack 
practicality. 
 
4.  A Policy for Generating Competition: Agendas for Relevant Antitrust  
 To pics 
After section 3 has outlined more general characteristics of an adequate 
competition policy agenda for industrializing countries resembling the stylized facts 
as discussed in section 2, this section offers some more detailed thoughts on the 
traditional fields of competition policy: anti-cartel policy, merger control, abuse 
control, and policy against unfair competition. 
 
4.1 Cartels and Anticompetitive Agreements 
Hardcore cartels (i.e. price-fixing, quantity-allocating, quota, market division) are 
among the business arrangements that most seriously violate competition and, 
therefore, combating them should definitely be one of the priorities on the 
competition policy agenda of industrializing countries. Other cartels and 
cooperative agreements like R&D-cooperation, marketing cartels, terms and 
condition agreements, etc., may cause anticompetitive effects or not depending on 
their structure and extent. Thus, a general prohibition of a set of clearly defined 
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types of cartels (hardcore cartels) without exemption represents a priority. This is 
also where scarce resources should be focused on: the detection and prosecution 
of these hardcore cartels. 
The case of the remaining types of intercompany agreements is more difficult. Even 
though each case may involve pro- and anticompetitive effects here, we do not 
recommend a (resource-intensive) balancing of single-agreement effects – due to 
the reasons discussed in section 3. Furthermore, if market participants need to 
learn to focus on procompetitive strategies and need to unlearn favoring collusive 
arrangements over performance (i.e. if a spirit of competition needs to develop), 
then it is recommendable to prohibit these types of cartels as well, possibly 
complemented by clearly and unambiguously defined exemptions. Regarding the 
latter, it is important to base the exemptions on a small set of clear-cut and 
(comparatively) easily assessable criteria in order to provide guidance and avoid 
gateways for the injection of non-competition influences and interests into the 
competition policy process. In economies that resemble the characteristics outlined 
in section 2, we recommend a cautious approach towards exemptions. In these 
industrializing economies, the harm to welfare of prohibiting some efficient arran-
gements is considerably less than the harm to welfare from continuing, 
consolidating and further reinforcing anticompetitive practices, traditions and (bu-
siness) cultures.  
 
4.2  Merger Control 
There has been vast numbers of economic studies which have focused on pro- and 
anticompetitive impacts of mergers. Treatment of mergers in contrary to cartels is 
not that straightforward (sophisticated in practice). Mergers have their good effects 
(promoting efficiency and welfare) and bad effects (reducing competition and 
welfare) but of course not all mergers are welfare-enhancing and not all of them 
welfare-reducing. In case of mergers, sketching a sharp border between pro- and 
anticompetitive is not trivial. However, notwithstanding this, merger control is a 
necessary ingredient for an industrializing country competition policy agenda for 
two reasons: 


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- firstly, mergers can be used as a strategy to circumvent anti-cartel policy, i.e. 
if market-wide hardcore cartels come under the attack of the competition 
authority, the cartelizing companies may just revert to merge and form a 
monopoly. 
- secondly, merger control is necessary in order to prevent the genesis of too 
many dominant firms (which are expensive and difficult to control 
afterwards, see section 4.3) or even outright monopolies. 
Due to the complex economic effects, merger control in industrialized countries 
typically involves sophisticated and rather expansive economic case analysis with 
advanced instruments like merger simulation, structural modeling and 
sophisticated econometric analysis based upon large and extensive data sets (Bud-
zinski & Ruhmer 2010; Rubinfeld 2010, 2011). Since this advanced and resource-
intensive approach may be inappropriate for many competition policy regimes in 
industrializing countries, they need to take a less ambitious approach and accept 
some compromise between practicability and economic accuracy. For instance, 
merger prohibitions could be related to a single criterion like market shares 
(according to a standardized market definition procedure): a merger is prohibited if 
it leads to a market share of more than x per cent in one of the relevant markets.15 
Admitted, this is a rather crude rule from an economic point of view that will lead 
to blocking some innocuous mergers. However, it is superior to (i) having no mer-
ger control at all as well as to (ii) fail to enforce merger control because the 
complex balancing of effects overstrains the competition authority capabilities and 
resources – or those of other elements of the competition policy regime (law 
courts, etc.)16.  
The simple market share-based prohibition rule may be supplemented by granting 
an exception if the merging companies can prove sufficiently large positive merger 
effects. It is important, however, that the burden to prove the positive effects falls 
on the merging companies, so that the competition authority and/or the courts 

15 Without going into detail, Vietnam has a comparable rule that prohibits mergers leading to mar-
ket shares of more than 50 per cent. 
16 Budzinski (2010) - and the literature quoted therein - offers some insight into how even far 
developed and experienced competition policy regimes may be overstrained. 
20 

play more the role of an inspector or examiner of the reasons for seeking an 
exception – instead of having to produce and present sophisticated evidence 
themselves. Beyond this, we do not think that it is recommendable to engage in 
cases where the economics are most complex and the effects – compared to mo-
nopoly or dominance cases – rather small, like unilateral effects in pre- and post-
merger oligopolistic markets. 
From an economic point of view, we recommend a merger control that is 
considerably stricter towards monopoly and dominance cases but more lenient 
towards oligopolistic cases than can typically be observed in industrialized 
economies. The reason for this recommendation again refers to the need for 
guidance and promotion of a spirit of competition. Furthermore, a priority on ge-
nerating competition often demands deconcentrating markets rather than 
preventing an excessive concentration process. A comparatively restrictive merger 
control is a helpful tool for achieving this goal. A rather harsh instrument of merger 
control would be to include the option of forced unbundling of dominant compa-
nies or groups (trust busting). This can only be recommended if many markets 
suffer from quasi-monopolistic incumbents that are de facto incontestable and 
maybe intertwined with privileged families or groups. An independent competition 
authority may then be an appropriate means to erode this competition-blocking 
power in the course of time. 
 
4.3 Abuse Control 
Similarly to merger control, controlling the economic behavior of market-
dominating companies quickly becomes a complex and sophisticated business if 
competition authorities target an optimal policy according to modern industrial 
economics insight here. However, again, it is questionable whether it fits to the 
prior-ranking economic problems of industrializing countries to target the final 
percentages of marginal efficiencies from fine-tuning the abuse control of compa-
nies that achieved a dominant position by performance in competition and are 
surrounded by well-established competitive market structures and processes. In 
contrast, the characteristics outlined in section 2 imply that in many industrializing 

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economies dominant companies are incumbents who used to enjoy all kinds of pri-
vileges and may be intertwined with politics and/or influential families. Quite na-
turally, competing on the merits is far away from the mindset and experience of 
these former monopolists and, at the same time, they often still enjoy market po-
wer, superior financial means and connections to other incumbents. “Just” 
privatizing and (institutionally) liberalizing may not suffice to generate competition 
in such markets because the natural reaction of the incumbents will be to target 
any type of protection against upcoming competitive forces in order to avoid being 
pulled into a competitive environment and to prolong their anticompetitive rents 
into and through the era of privatization and liberalization.  
If these are the relevant problems, then a competition authority does not need to 
worry whether abuse control may constrain (comparatively17) marginal efficiency 
gains by the incumbent. Instead, the task at hand is to generate competition in the 
first place and to educate the incumbent to play in a procompetitive way. Thus, we 
consider it useful to focus on avoiding the most harmful practices by implementing 
per se prohibitions of a limited number of particularly harmful practices for domi-
nant companies. This may well include practices that are viewed to be not that 
harmful in well-developed market economies like, for instance, resale price mainte-
nance, predatory pricing, special types of price discrimination, exclusive dealing, 
etc. Doing so serves two purposes: 
- educating business to focus on unambiguously procompetitive strategies 
and thus providing guidance as well as building a spirit of competition, 
- protecting fringe entrants into the incumbent-dominated markets in order to 
generate future competition. 
In particular the latter may cause industrial economists specialized in the 
competition policy of fully-industrialized countries to frown because ‘protecting 
competition instead of protecting competitors’ has been one of the buzzwords of 
recent reform trends in most major competition regimes of the industrialized 

17 Here, “comparatively” refers to a comparison to competition generating policies targeting the 
competitive revival of sclerotic ‘markets’. 
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world.18 However, keep in mind that the task at hand differs in the industrializing 
world: instead of protecting a well-working and fully-developed market 
competition, a competitive environment needs to be generated in the face of non-
competitive structures, traditions and mindsets. Therefore, newly-emerging 
competitors need to be protected against squeezing and deterrence strategies that 
factually rest upon the anticompetitively accomplished market power by the 
incumbents – irrespective of whether it can be proven that the new competitors are 
already more efficient than the incumbent or not. First of all, the emerging busi-
ness needs to get a real chance of demonstrating their abilities! In contrast to many 
industrialized countries, this chance of opportunity may not exist without an abuse 
control disciplining the incumbents and forcing (and educating) them to strictly 
compete on the merits only. 
 
4.4 Unfair Competition 
The latter is closely related to the different role that fairness considerations should 
play in industrializing countries (of the type specified in section 2) compared to 
long-established market economies. According to the reasoning of section 3.3, the 
competition policy agenda of industrializing countries benefits from including a 
policy against unfair competition which is not limited to dominant companies. In 
order to educate business to behave competitively as well as in order to promote a 
competition culture in business and society (promoting the spirit of competition), a 
clearly defined set of business strategies and arrangements should be per se 
prohibited that are (more or less) consensually deemed to be unfair in society. 
Examples may include boycotts and discrimination, misleading or untrue 
advertisement, defamation of competitors (through advertisement or otherwise), 
espionage and sabotage, etc. Furthermore, due to the importance of guidance and 
promoting a competition culture, the intent to behave anticompetitively may justify 
intervention irrespective of the effects. In contrast, in the U.S., for instance, effects 
appear to dominate intent, i.e. even if there is anticompetitive intent, if the result is 

18 See the reflective analysis of Fox (2003). 

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efficiency-increasing then it is considered not to be a problem.19 If business must 
learn competition to begin with, however, such a policy would significantly erode 
educating signals and damage the acceptance of competition in society. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Developing countries are subjected to different especial economic characteristics 
which should be undoubtedly considered when competition policy is getting 
formed. We look at some typical characteristics of industrializing countries (section 
2) in order to describe how an appropriate competition policy agenda for countries 
that come close to resembling those characteristics may look like. In terms of gene-
ral principles (section 3), a case-by-case approach may be superior if knowledge 
about individual case effects are available, competition agency is well-equipped 
with staff, resources and (economic) expertise, business is experienced with market 
competition and competition rules, guidance is less important than fine-tuning and 
competition culture is well established. However, these conditions are certainly 
rather met by fully industrialized countries. A rule-based approach, on the other 
hand, is superior if knowledge about average effects is significantly better available 
than knowledge about individual case effects, the agency faces limitations in bud-
get, there is lack of expertise on sophisticated economic methods and instruments, 
business needs guidance in order to learn procompetitive strategies and 
competition culture is not well established yet. Thus, the current state of many 
industrializing countries fits better with the characteristics featuring a rule-based 
approach. Therefore, the balance between these two approaches should be more 
shifted towards general rules for industrializing jurisdictions than in high-profile 
competition regimes (section 3.2). 
Another difference refers to the role of guidance and fairness considerations 
(section 3.3). They are considerably more important in industrializing countries than 
in long- and well-established market economies. It seems like the spirit of 

19 For instance, evidence of anticompetitive intent was dismissed to be relevant in (parts of) the 
U.S. proceedings against Microsoft and or the Whole Foods/Wild Oats-merger (see Budzinski 
2010: 461 and the literature quoted there). 
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competition has not been in line with societal facts in many industrializing count-
ries. Therefore, building a competition culture is necessary in order to breathe life 
into competitive markets created by institutional framework conditions 
(liberalization, privatization) but that remain inanimate due to the lack of a spirit of 
competition by local business. Furthermore, many industrializing countries face li-
mitations in budget in implementing a comprehensive competition policy so they 
should allocate budget to treat strategies based on priorities otherwise execution 
of an optimal policy is not practical (section 3.4).  
In summary, there is no one size-fits-all competition policy agenda. Instead, diffe-
rent economic needs and characteristics require different antitrust answers. For 
industrializing countries that are well described by the characteristics set out in 
section 2 of this paper, generating competition is the more relevant task than 
purely protecting already existing and well-functioning competition. This requires a 
different emphasis (section 4). Combating the most severe anticompetitive practi-
ces and arrangements is the obvious priority. However, there are some implications 
that are often overlooked. In particular, the more important role of guidance, the 
promotion of a competition culture and acceptance as well as fairness 
considerations imply a comparatively restrictive abuse and merger control (the 
latter focusing on dominance and monopoly cases) as well as a strict policy against 
unfair competition including anticompetitive intent. 
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